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OUTSOURCING POWER: HOW
PRIVATIZING MILITARY EFFORTS
CHALLENGES ACCOUNTABILITY,
PROFESSIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
MARTHA MINOW *
Abstract: Private contractors have played key roles in recent high-profile
scandals. These scandals hint at the degree to which the U.S. military has
increased the scope and scale of its reliance on private security companies
in recent decades. This trend offers many advantages, including nimble-
ness in the deployment of expertise and geographic flexibility. But it also
departs from conventional methods of accountability through both
public oversight and private market discipline. The lack of transparency
in the use of private contractors compounds the problem of assessing the
impact of their increasing role. Failures of basic governmental oversight
to ensure contract enforcement by the Department of Defense are well-
documented. Departures from conventional government contracting
procedures exacerbate these failures and obscure whether inherently
governmental functions are in effect privatized. The large sums of money
involved contribute to risks of corruption and a scale of private lobbying
that can distort the legislative process. These developments jeopardize the
effectiveness of military activities, the professionalism of the military, the
integrity of the legislative process and foreign policy decision making,
public confidence in the government, national self-interest, and the
stability of the world order.
INTRODUCTION
In a time of scandals, three recent ones share a disturbing,
though perhaps not initially obvious, element.
* Jeremiah Smith, Jr. Professor, Harvard Law School. This paper derives from the Ce-
cil A. Wright Lecture, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, January 20, 2004. For insight-
ful comments and questions, the Author thanks the editors of the Boston College Law Review;
Dean Ron Daniels and members of the audience at the Cecil A. Wright Lecture at the Uni-
versity of Toronto; David Luban, Nancy Sherman, and students in their Joint Seminar on
War at Georgetown University; and participants in the March 24, 2004, Harvard Law
School Conference, Governance by Design. Special thanks to Brishon Rogers, Mira Edmonds,
and Amanda K. Edwards for research assistance, and Jody Freeman, Bob Monks, and Joe
Singer for conversations about this work.
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• Congressional and media sources charge the Halliburton
Company, a Houston-based oil services firm previously headed
by Vice President Richard Cheney,' with overcharging $61 mil-
lion worth of gasoline and for charging $186 million for meals
not actually served as part of its $10 billion worth of contracts
with the Department of Defense (the "DOD") to support the
U.S. military effort in Iraq. 2
 Halliburton holds the two largest
contracts for reconstruction in Iraq with $2.5 billion to restore
the oil infrastructure and $6.5 billion to provide the troops
with housing, food, laundry, and other services. 3 The contracts
guaranteed the company a profit and allowed it to pass on all
of its expenses to the government. 4 One account indicates that
the unaccounted-for charges amount to 43% of the amount
the company billed, 5 though that estimate understates the full
1 Cheney still holds 433,000 unexercised stock options in the company and also re-
ceives deferred salary from Halliburton. An Oversight Hearing on Iraq Contracting Abuses:
Before the S. Democratic Policy Comm., 108th Cong. 4 (2004) [hereinafter Dorgan Hearing]
(statement of Sen. Byron L. Dorgan, Chairman, Democratic Policy Comm.).
2 Julie Mason, Halliburton Back in the Fray, HOUSTON CIIRON., Sept. 18, 2004, at A26.
The Army threatened to withhold payments until the company provided requested docu-
mentation for supported charges. David Ivanovich, Army, Halliburton Talk Settlement, H ous-
TON CIIRON., Oct. 23, 2004, at DI. In the midst of settlement negotiations over the unac-
counted charges, the company's leaders claim that they have made little profit and would
demand a much larger profit margin when rebidding. Simon Romero, Halliburton Weighs
Options as Iraq Work Changes, N.Y. Timm, Sept. 8, 2004, at C3. Yet some allege Halliburton
spent millions of dollars on kickbacks on Kuwaiti contracts and on items including mono-
grammed towels for the company's health club. William D. Hartung, Senior Research Fel-
low, World Policy Institute, Prepared Statement at the Briefing on An Incomplete Transi-
tion: An Assessment of the June 30th Transition and Its Aftermath: Private Military
Contractors in Iraq and Beyond: A Question of Balance ( June 22, 2004),
http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/updates/FPIFJune2004.houl . With the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, Halliburton settled separate charges of misleading
financial statements. Richard Whittle & Jim Landers, Chency's Years at Halliburton Under
Scrutiny, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 8, 2004, at 1A.
3 Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman).
4
 Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Panel to Hear of Halliburton Waste. Pos -r, July 22, 2004, al
El. Concerns about shifting all the costs to citizens and the resulting massive overcharging
occupied Congressional discussion in hearings about Halliburton and other private con-
tractors in Iraq. See generally Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1.
5 David 'feather, Halliburton Accused of Not Justifying Elbri Army Bills, GUARDIAN (Lon-
don), Aug. 12, 2004, at 17; see also Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1. at 20 (testimony of Dan-
ielle Brian, Exec. Director of Project on Government Oversight). On transport subcon-
tracting, a subcontract administrator discovered that the price was inflated by 500%, but
no effort was made to recover these costs. Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1, at 25-26 (testi-
mony of Maria deYoung, former Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.
("KBR'') employee).
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$5.6 billion of contracts awarded since the start of the Iraq
war.°
• The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ("DARPA"), a re-
search and development division within the DOD, launched in
early 2002 an undertaking it initially called the Total Information
Awareness project, but for political reasons later renamed as the
Terrorist Information Awareness project ("TIA"). 7 The project de-
veloped advanced information technology tools to use domestic
and foreign databases in both governmental and commercial
hands to search for "patterns that are related to predicted terrorist
activities."8 TIA used mathematical algorithms and other features
of governmental software to "mine" data about any person, includ-
ing "religious and political contributions; driving records; high
school transcripts; book purchases; medical records; passport ap-
plications; car rentals; and phone, e-mail and internet search
logs."9 Overseen by John Poindexter, who was indicted for his in-
volvement in efforts to provide secret and illicit support to a mili-
tary force in Nicaragua in the Iran-Contra scandal,i° TIA formally
O'1-farrow, supra note 4, at El. Full information about the billing has not been avail-
able to the Congress or to the public. The Pentagon blocked Congressional efforts to se-
cure full information about Halliburton's billing under a $2.5 billion contract for oil site
repairs and fuel imports. Erik Eckholm, Lawmakers, Including Republicans, Criticize Pentagon
on Disputed Billing by Halliburton, N.Y. Timis, June 22, 2005, at A10.
'For a longer analysis of the program, see Peter Galison & Martha Minow, Our Privacy,
On rsclves in the Age of Technological Intrusions, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE "WAR ON TERROR"
(Richard Ashby Wilson ed., forthcoming Nov. 2005). Additionally, see DEP''' . OF DEF. TEcii.
PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM., SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM,
15-20 (2004), available at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.pdf.
Probably the first public indication of the effort appeared in testimony by the Director of
DARPA before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Fiscal 2003 Defense Request, Combat-
ing Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 107th Cong. 10 (2002) (state-
ment of Dr. Tony Tether, Director, DARPA).
8
 DEF. ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, REPOITI"TO CONGRESS REGARDING Tim
TERRORISM INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM: IN RESPONSE TO CONSOLIDATED APPRO-
PRIATIONS RESOLUTION, 2003, Pun. L. No. 108-7, DIVISION M, § 111(b) at 14 (2003),
littp://www.efLorg/Privacy/T1A/TIA-report,pdf.
9
 ELEANOR ACER ST AL., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW
NORMAL: LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR 'THE POST'-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES, at ix
(Fiona Doherty & Deborah Pearlstein eds., 2003), http://iww.humanrightsfirst.org/
pubsidescriptions/Assessing/AssessingTheNewNormal.pdf (report funded by the Atlantic
Philanthropies, the John Merck Fund, the Open Society Institute, Matthew Dontzin, and
Equal Justice Works fellowship). The Lawyers Committee changed its name recently to
Human Rights First.
19
 LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT or Till 1NDEPF.NDENT COUNSEL FUR
IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS, at xiii-xxiii (1993), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/ .
Oliver North was an aide to National Security Advisor John Poindexter. Bernard Weintraub,
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ended when Congress shut down its funding in the face of media
critiques and opposition from political leaders on both the right
and the left wings." Yet Congress still permits counterterrorism in-
telligence that targets foreign nations; 199 data mining projects
receive or will receive federal support, and many TIA projects may
proceed under classified programs outside of public visibility."
• Shocking digital photographs of cruel and abusive practices used
by interrogators and guards at the U.S.-run Iraq prison at Abu
Ghraib sparked massive investigations." Confirming the worst al-
legations of imperialism and inhumanity leveled by terrorist
propaganda, these revelations brought shame and worldwide
criticism to America."
Although not the major element in each story, one common
thread among these scandals is the role played by private contractors
working for the U.S. government in its response to the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. The Halliburton scandal stands out as the most obvious. The
largest private oil and military services company in the country, Halli-
burton received, without competitive bidding, the contract to manage
the logistical planning for the Iraq war—and promptly reported a
Iran Payment Found Diverted to Contras, Reagan Security Adviser and Aide Are Out, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 1986, at Al.
II Balance Information With Privacy, ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., Dec. 10, 2003, at A22; William
Safire, Privacy Invasion Curtailed, N.1'. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at A41 (noting range of oppo-
nents); Virtual Borders vs. Civil Liberties, DENVER POST, May 31, 2004, at C7. DARPA had
identified a range of technologies contributing to TIA, and there is no indication that
termination of TIA involved terminating development or use of these other technologies.
See DARPA, supra note 8, at app. B.
12 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS
COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES 2 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04548.pdf {hereinafter GAO-04-548] (requested by Sen. Daniel K. Altaka (D-Hawaii)); R.
Mohanakrishnan, A Programme to Monitor Terrorists Links, 1-lINnu (India), Dec. 13, 2004, at
16, available at h ttp://www.hinduonnet.com/2004/12/13/stories/2004121300551600 .
lam; Total/Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA): Is It Truly Dead?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
Oct. 3, 2003, hup://www.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/20031003_comments.php.
13 See Josh White & Scott Higham, Army Calls Abuses 'Aberrations': Report Cites 94 Detainee-
Mistreatment Cases in Iraq and Afghanistan, WAsit. PosT, July 23, 2004, at Al.
14 See Michael A. Fuoco, Forever Stained by Prison Abuse Scandal, PITISBURGII PosT-
GAZETTE, Dec. 21, 2004, at Al; Richard A. Serrano, 4th Soldier Guilty in Prison Scandal, L.A.
Thus, Nov. 3, 2004, at Al2; Helen Thomas, No One, Not Even Bush, Is Above the Law, nous-
TON CintoN., July 2, 2004, at A36. In June 2005, international media reported that the U.S.
Department of Defense no longer treated the abuse scandal as a matter of public concern
while Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld considered a promotion for Lieutenant Gen-
eral Ricardo Sanchez, the commander in Iraq during the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scan-
dal. See Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Ex-Top General in Iraq in Line for Promotion, INTI
HERALD Thin., June 21, 2005, at 10.
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62% jump in revenues. 15 Government officials defended the selection
of Halliburton on grounds that it was the only firm large enough to
manage the job, but Peter Singer notes that Halliburton often out-
sources further, hiring subcontractors with nationals from countries
including Bangladesh and the Philippines. 16
With private contractors working for the military comes the prac-
tice of subcontracting, which raises the question of whether such an
arrangethent should allow the corporation to distance itself from re-
sponsibility any more than a contracting relationship should allow the
military to separate itself from the acts of its contractor's employees.
In addition, the use of private contractors by the military foreseeably
creates extra problems of supervision and control. Legal and political
responses will determine whether those problems are excused or in-
stead monitored sufficiently to create incentives for adequate over-
sight.
Investigative reports into the abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison
identify participation of private contractors as one example of the
poor supervision, confused lines of authority, and improper proce-
dures at that site. ] ? One report, produced by a panel of U.S. generals,
concludes that "[dontracting-related issues contributed to the prob-
lems at Abu Ghraib prison."Ig An earlier internal Army report traces
the involvement of civilian interpreters and interrogators working for
CACI International, Inc. ("CACI") and Titan Corp. (-ITN") in con-
junction with military officers, and concludes that they were either
directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Gliraib. 19 CACI
denied involvement of its employees in the abuse, but also asserted
15 Peter W. Singer, Warriors for Hire in Iraq, SALoN.com , Apr. 15, 2004, http://ar
chive.salon.com/news/feature/2004/04/15/warriors/index_np.ht1111.
1t1
17 See generally MG GEORGE R. FAY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION or Tut: Aim GIIRAIII DE-
TENTION FAGILEEY AND 205TH MILEEARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE (2004), littp://www.de
fenselink.milinews/Aug2004/d20040825fay,pdf thereinafter Fay Report],
18 See id. at 47. One of the companies denies any involvement, although an internal
Army report had identified one of its employees as a key player. Ellen McCarthy, Changes
Behind the Barbed Wire: New Standards Are in Place for the Oversight of Contract Workers at Alm
Ghmib Prison, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2004, at El. Steven Schooner concludes that "CACI
International provided more than half of the interrogators employed at the facility, while
Titan supplied linguistics personnel," and that more than a third of the improper inci-
dents involved contractor personnel." Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu
Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 S•AN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 549, 555 (2005).
19 McCarthy, supra note 18, at El (quoting a leaked internal Army report by Major
General Antonio Taguba).
994	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 46:989
that the individuals in question were no longer employees." Titan
quickly responded that the individual associated with its operations
actually worked for a subcontractor. 2' Minimal or missing oversight
seems to characterize recent military use of contractors. 22 Dan Guttman
at the Center for Public Integrity reports that only a thin layer of
official oversight existed for the contractors running the TIA data min-
ing project." Admiral Poindexter came to the DOD agency DARPA
after working with Syntek Technologies to develop the research tools
that became the basis of TIA. 24 TIA worked by awarding contracts to
private companies." Through a lawsuit seeking enforcement of the
Freedom of Information Act (the "FOIA"), 26 a nonprofit organization
obtained information about the DOD contracts with private entities for
TIA activities, including large corporations such as Booz Allen Hamil-
ton,27 Lockheed Martin, and several universities. 28 The government has
long contracted out research and development work as well as informa-
tion technology.29 Yet outsourcing the tasks of monitoring Americans as
part of government investigations seems to represent a new degree of
privatization.
The roles played by private contractors in these incidents offer a
glimpse of not only the variety and scale of outsourcing by the U.S.
military in recent years, but also the departures from conventional
methods of accountability accomplished by extensive use of private
28 Id.
21 Spencer E. Ante & Stan Crock, The Other U.S. Military, Bus. WK., May 31, 2004, at 76
(on June 21, 2004, Business Week published a retraction for erroneously describing a civil-
ian cited in a report on Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse as an employee of CACI International,
Inc., instead of as a Titan subcontractor); see Dan Guttman, The Shadow Pentagon, CFR. FOR
PUR. INTEGRITY, Oct. 8, 2004, http://www.publicuttegrity.org/pus/report.aspx?aid=386.
22 See Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1, at 1-2.
25 See generally Guttman, supra note 21.
21 Analysis of Total Information Awareness ContractorDocuments, EI.EC. PRIVACY INFO. Cut.,
Feb. 2003, http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/doc_analysis.html  [hereinafter
EPIC]; Adam Mayle & Alex Knott, Outsourcing Big Brother: Office of Total Information Awarenss
Relics on Private Sector to Track Americans, CYR. FOR l'un. INTEGRITY, Dec. 17, 2002, http://
www.public-i.orgireportaspx ?aid=106 (stating that DARPA awarded private contracts
amounting to $23 million).
25
 See generally Mayle & Knott, supra note 24.
26 See generally Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Def., 241 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2003).
27 Boos Allen received a $62 million contract to work on TIA. U.S. Dcio . 1 - of DEF., CON-
TRACT (2002), available at http:/ /www.d efensel k.mil/con tracts/ 2002/c11122002_ct577-02.
hunt.
28 Id.
" Nancy Ferris, Give and Take, GovExEc.com , July 1, 2003, http://www.govexec.com/
features/0603/ots03s4.htm ("Even before the current push to outsource, contractors were
doing at least three-quarters of the federal government's IT work . . . .") .
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contractors. Typically proceeding without much publicity or disclo-
sure, private contractors working for the military theoretically could
be subject to two systems of accountability: public oversight and pri-
vate market discipline. Yet in practice, military contractors often
evade the oversight intended to determine contract performance and
also often bypass private market competition through sole-source bids
and other waivers of marketplace practices." Private contractors may
also enjoy exclusions from other legal constraints that would attach to
government actors engaged in the very same activities."
The prospect of unaccountable private military contractors is
disturbing, but also inconsistent with growing demands for compli-
ance with human rights globally. Federal courts in the United
States have opened their doors to claims by foreigners of human
rights violations by U.S. citizens and U.S.-based corporations acting
outside U.S. boundaries. 32 Someday, federal courts may accept suits
" See Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time of Reflection and
Choice, 33 Pun. Cowl'. L.J. 321, 344 (2004); Schooner, supra note 18, at 564-69.
31 Even when subsidized by the government, actions by private actors are not governed
by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
read, "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws,"
other than in limited exceptions. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I; see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996)
(finding that private prison guards act "under color of state law," thus presenting state
action); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1690 (2d ed. 1988); Shirley L.
Mays, Privatization of Municipal Services: A Contagion in the Body Politics, 34 Dug. L. lbw. 41,
45-46 (1995); Glenn Chatmas Smith, We've Got Your Number! (Is It Constitutional to Give It
Out?): Caller Identification Technology and the Right to Informational Privacy, 37 UCLA L REV.
145, 154 (1989) (reviewing contrasting decisions about state action). Private entities sbni-
larly are exempt from the disclosure obligations that apply to government entities. Craig
D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of Public Access to Private
Entities Under Federal Law, 52 Fey. COMM. L.J. 21, 25, 33-34 (1999). The Fourth Amend-
ment's guarantee against unreasonable searches or seizures does not attach to private enti-
ties unless they can be characterized as agents of the government. See United States v. Ja-
cobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Elise M. Bloom, Madeleine Schachter, & Elliot H.
Steelman, Competing Interests in the Post 9-11 Workplace: The New Line Between Privacy and
Safety, 29 WM. MUCIIELL L. REV. 897, 899-900 (2003).
" See Sosa V. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2761-62 (2004) (finding jurisdiction under
Alien Tort Claims Act for cases alleging some violations of the law of nations); Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (granting jurisdiction in a case of alleged torture of a
Paraguayan national by a former Paraguayan official); Daphne Eviatar, Judgment Day Will an
Obscure Law Bring Down the Global Economy?, Ilositm Gt.ont:, Dec. 28, 2003, at Dl. 'Ilie applica-
tion of the Alien Tort Claims Act to impose liability on corporations for human rights violations
generated considerable attention because of potentially massive liabilities. Tawny Aine Bridge-
ford, Note and Comment, Imputing Human Rights Obligations on Multinational Cot The
Ninth Ciiruit Strikes Again in Judicial Activism, 18 Am. U. MI. L. REV. 1009, 1020-21 (2003).
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against U.S. corporations consulting with foreign governments—
even though judicial remedies would be unavailable for abuses aris-
ing from the same contractors' work for the U.S. military, given the
court-made government contractor defense."
The current scale of the military's use of private contractors
makes the question of accountability particularly pressing. 34
 Private
military companies—not merely individuals offering their services
as mercenaries33—have a long lineage," but never have been more
central to the U.S. military strategy than in the deployment in Iraq. 57
Peter Singer, one of the key observers of this trend, notes that private
military firms in Iraq employ between 20,000 and 30,000 people—and
that this, taken together, represents the second-largest force in Iraq
after the U.S. military." Private military companies guard U.S. gener-
In Sosa u Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court declined to immunize corporations from
application of the Alien Tort Claims Act. 124 S.Ct. at 2766;• see also Lisa Girion, Court Ohs Foreign-
Abuse Suits, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2004, at Cl. This development produced a settlement in the
suit against Unocal, in which noncitizens alleged that the corporation was complicit with the
Myanmar army that allegedly engaged in forced labor, murder, and rape while working jointly
with Unocal on a pipeline. See Doe 1 v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 939-40 (9111 Cir. 2002), Iry 'd
en bane 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Duncan Campbell, Energy Giant Agrees Settlement with Bur
MSC ViliagerS, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 15, 2004, at 17.
" The defense is based on an extension of sovereign immunity. See Anita Bernstein, How
Can a Product Be Liable?, 45 DUKE U. 1, 77-78 (1995); Peter J. Ekberg, Note, Rentole6., Delivered
Landmines and International Law, 33 Cour M. J. TRANSNAVL L. 149, 164 (1995) ("[Government
contract defense] protects a government contractor from liability for actions performed while
complying with government specifications,"); Larryi. Gusman, Note, RethinkingBoyle v. United
Technologies Corp. Government Contractor Defense: Judicial Preemption of the Doctrine of Separation of
Powers?, 39 Am. U. L. REV. 391, 393-94 (1990). The government contractor defense thus would
collide with the law of nations; the defense itself may be difficult to sustain in the context of
service contracts with performance standards rather than specifications of inputs or design. See
infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
34 See Michinobu Yanagisawa, The Shadowy World of Guns for Hire, DAn.v YoMIURI (To-
kyo), May 11, 2005, at 2.
35 Mercenaries helped give Alexander the Great his name, Henry II banned the Flemish
mercenaries that nearly kept him from the throne and hired his own mercenaries, and merce-
naries worked for Ramses II and King David. Sec KENNETH FOWLER, MEDIEVAL MERCENARIES ix
(2001); KEN SILVERSTEIN, PRIVATE WARRIORS xv, 143 (2000); SERGE YALICIIEV, MERCENARIES OF
'ME ANcrEN'r WORLD 43-49, 65, 173-75 (1997); Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia:
A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2003); W. Scott
Jessee„ Mercenaries, READER'S COMPANION To MILITARY EIISTDRY, http://college.limco.com/his
tory/readerscomp/mil/hunl/mh033800_mercemuies.hun(last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
"6 Norse mercenaries worked for companies that helped the Byzantine Empire in
1032. See Milliard, supra note 35, at 2, 9. Free companies of mercenary troops became a
familiar staple of Medieval warfare. FOWI.ER , supra note 35, at ix-x; P. (PETER) W. SINGER,
CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 22-26 (2003).
37 See Yanagisawa, supra note 34, at 2.
38 Id.
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als, essential military sites, and U.S. government compounds in Iraq. 39
The private military companies offer their services to other nations,
of course, generating about $100 billion in annual revenues around
the globe.40 For instance, one U.S. company trained the Croat leader-
ship for eight months, which then defeated Serb forces in 1995. 41
Familiar in the medieval era, private companies creating and de-
ploying troops diminished with the rise of nation-states, which were
capable of raising and supporting their own military and which devel-
oped the conception that sovereign nation-states alone may legiti-
mately use military force. 42 The rise of the nation-state marked a shift
from multinational armies, composed of soldiers recruited from many
places, to the citizen-army." Emerging nation-states asserted their
monopoly over not only the legitimate use of force, but also their own
citizens' use of force in and outside the nation's territory." By the
twentieth century, only those places with legacies of imperialism or
temporary shortages of manpower deployed soldiers-for-hire, and the
list of such exceptions (for example, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Angola, and
Nigeria) matches a list of global trouble spots. 45
Yet the downsizing of major military efforts at the end of the Cold
War and the end of apartheid in South Africa created a supply of indi-
viduals with military training in this country and elsewhere who could
market their services." The widespread hope that privatization would
improve efficiency and save costs for nation-states in turn generated
enormous governmental demand for private contractors. 47 Privatiza-
tion in the abstract could mean ending government involvement alto-
39 Daniel Bergner, The Other Army, N.Y. TIMES MAC., Aug. 14,2005, at 29-31.
40 Barry Yeoman, Need an Army? Just Pick up the Phone, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,2004, at A19
(citing Peter W. Singer).
41 Milliard, supra note 35, at 11-15 (describing fourteen-person team from Military
Professional Resources, Inc.). Companies organized in the United Kingdom, South Africa,
and Israel, as well as in the United States, have built the modern privatized military indus-
try, See Singer, supra note 36, at 9-17.
42
 Deborah Avant, Think Again: Mercenaries, FOREIGN PoCv, july/Aug. 2004, at 20,
available at littp://svww.foreignpolicy,com/story/cms.php?story id=2577Scprint=1; Clif-
ford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal
States, 36 C0NN. L. REV. 879,912-13 (2004); Janice E. Thomson, State Practices, International
Norms, and the Decline of Mercenarism, 34 INT't, &run. Q. 23,26-27,34-35 (1990).
es Thomson, supra note 42, at 26.
" Id. at 30-31,34-39.
43 Sec id. at 27.
46 jitmEs R. DAVIS, FORTUNE'S WARRIORS 109 (2000); Singer, supra note 36, at 49, 103;
cf: Thontson, supra note 42, at 39 (19th century demobilization of British led to surplus of
British officers, who joined the Latin American conflicts).
47 See Singer, supra note 36, at 66-70.
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gether either by selling off public assets or terminating government
funding and involvement in a particular activity. But with much federal
governmental action—and most DOD initiatives—privatization simply
becomes reliance on nongovernmental actors who are paid under pub-
licly-funded contracts or vouchers.48 Increasingly, ordinary day-to-day
government operations proceed this way. 49
 Private companies work un-
der contracts to manage welfare programs, enforce child support obli-
gations, and build and operate prisons." Intended to save money and
bring efficiency, the private sector introduces competitive bidding and
techniques of business management to government operations."
In my own work, I have explored the potential benefits to society
from privatization of schools and human services—involving for-
profit, as well as nonprofit and religious organizations. 52 These
benefits include innovation, efficiency, and replenishment of plural-
ism that itself can support individual freedom." There are risks, too:
risks of exclusionary practices, fraud, and religious coercion." There-
fore, I have argued, privatization should be accompanied by an insis-
tence on public values following private dollars. 55
 The content of
those values, in turn, should stem from the Constitution and from
public debate.56
Does privatization make sense when the operations themselves
involve the use of force—as they do with war, prisons, and police? 57 In
Canada, considerable privatization of social services has been fol-
lowed by large-scale privatization of prisons, police, and the military."
A decision to privatize the Canadian Forces' Department of Supply
and Warehousing generated critical television ads and the ironic
48 See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116
HAM'. L. REV. 1229, 1230-32 (2003); see also Guttman, supra note 30, at 330-31.
19
 SCE MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
3 (2002).
H See id. at 20; Minow, supra note 48, at 1242-46.
51 See Minow, supra note 48, at 1243.
52 See MINOW, SUM note 49, at 7-22.
H See Minow, supra note 48, at 1242-46.
54 Sec id. at 1246-55.
55 See MINOW, supra note 49, at 142-44.
56 See id. at 144-50.
57 See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE	 (forthcom-
ing); Clayton P, Gillette & Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limitations on Privatization, 46
Am. J. Comr. L. 481, 482-83 (1998); David A. Sklansky, The Private Pollee, 46 UCLA L. Rcv,
1165, 1168 (1999); Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private
Prison in Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 AM, GRIM. L. REV. 111, 134-35 (2001).
58 See Alan Cairns, jailhouse Blues: Ontario Towns Feel Sense of Betrayal as Gov't Leans to Pri-
vate-Run fails, TORONTO SUN, Apr. 2, 2000, at 32.
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phrase, "welcome to War-Mart."59 Private military companies recruit
employees from the United States, Canada, and around the world. 6°
This investigation of privatization within the U.S. military requires
further discussion about the nature and scope of its use of private
military companies. It also invites consideration of three kinds of
normative analysis that I pursue here. First, do the military contrac-
tors, once engaged, deliver what they promise? Second, does the use
of private contractors overall advance or detract from purposes articu-
lated by the military itself? Third, how well does the use of private
contractors serve (or disserve) the purposes of a military in a consti-
tutional democracy?
Before proceeding any further, I must acknowledge one great
limitation of this effort: the lack of transparency and disclosure makes
it difficult for the public—and for me—to know what is going on with
the military's use of private contractors. The private firms disclose
some of their activities in promoting their services, but they can resist
media and Congressional inquiries, claiming that they need to do so
to protect proprietary information.61 Private companies are free from
the disclosure obligations placed on the government by the FOIA, the
federal law intended to make democracy work by ensuring access to
all of the government's information compatible with security.62 There
is some authority that private companies enjoy the ability to enjoin
the government from disclosing information they have shared with
the government in the course of doing business together." As the
59 Ian McDougall, Bargain Warehouse: Union Irate as Army Privatizes Supply Department,
TORONTO SUN, Mar. 13, 2002, at 33.
Cf. Danilo Btarzan, Arrests Reignite Kosovo Cauldron, ADELAmt: AnvEkiISER (Austra-
lia), Aug. 5, 2000, at 56 (reporting that two Canadians, working for a private contractor,
were arrested for participation in training Iligoslay Republic forces).
61 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 35, at 145.
62 See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000); Nicole B. Casarez, Furthering
the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal Corrections: The Need for Access to Private Prison
Records, 28 U. Micti. J. L. R ►x. 249, 264-68 (1995); Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the
Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of Public Access to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52
FED. Comm. 1,,I. 21, 31 (1999). Application of FOIA turns on whether the entity in ques-
tion is an "agency" and whether the records in question should be considered "agency
records." See Felser, supra, at 31-32.
63
 Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Comment, The Freedom of Information Act Post 9-11: Balancing
the Public's Right to Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland Security, 53 Am. U. L.
RENT. 261, 293 n.188 (2003); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1) (defining agencies covered by
FOIA), 552(b)(4) (exempting trade secrets and commercial and financial information
that is privileged or confidential from statutory disclosure); Jack Beermann, Privatization
and Political Accountability, 28 FoRintAm URn. 14 1507, 1553-56 (2001); Jody Freeman,
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV, 1285, 1306 (2003);
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United States fears for its security and engages in war, the executive
branch is especially secretive, while Congress and the courts are more
than usually deferential. The general public seems mainly unaware of
and uninterested in examining the expanding role of private corpora-
tions in managing and operating force—weapons, prisons, and polic-
ing—in the name of the government. It remains surprising to people
to learn that private contractors are engaging in interrogations in
Guantanamo and Iraq, that publicly traded companies run prisons in
this country, or that. Halliburton built the military prison at Guan-
tanamo Bay, Cuba. 64 The lack of transparency about the scope and
effects of private company contracts with the U.S. military is not
merely a caveat admitting the limitations of my analysis, but an impor-
tant demerit as I try to assess how well the contractors are performing,
how well they are achieving goals of military purposes, and how well
they are achieving goals of a constitutional democracy.
Apparently, at least on some level, there is growing public aware-
ness of the presence of private military companies. A recent cartoon
in the New Yorker magazine shows a group of kids dressed up with
combat gear and toy guns. 65 One says to another, "Tommy and Ben
are like Green Berets, Dan and Jerry are Navy SEALS, and me and
Scott are like private contractors."66 Another cartoon earlier last year
shows one worker referring to two soldiers standing behind his desk
as his "private army."67 Tamed to be part of children's games or office
cubicle humor in an elite magazine, the outsourcing of force disturbs
at least our humorists. Let's see if we, too, should be disturbed. I will
pursue this inquiry both in terms of contract compliance and poten-
tial jeopardy to larger missions for the military, the nation, and de-
mocracy.
I. IS THERE BASIC CONTRACTUAL COMPLIANCE?
Whatever debates may arise over the norms that ought to apply in
evaluating the performance of private military contractors, the basic
Karen E. Jones, Comment and Casenote, The Effect of the Homeland Security Act on Online
Privacy and the Freedom of Information Act, 72 U. Cm. L. REV. 787, 800 (2003).
64 Singer, supra note 15.
65 William Hamilton, Cartoon, NEW YORKER, Oct. 4, 2004, at 89, available at
www.cartoonbank.com [ID 1193931 (depicting children pretending to be military person-
nel and "private contractors").
66 Id.
67 Charles Barsotti, Cartoon, NEW YORKER, May 3, 2004, at 34, available at www.car
toonbank.com [ID 70447] (satirizing the privatization of the Army).
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elements of contract compliance should not give rise to dispute. Do
contractors do what they are asked to do—and not do what they are
not asked to do? Massive outsourcing has drawn civilian military con-
tractors into military work without meaningful methods for ensuring
contractual compliance." The combination of the scale of the
outsourcing, poor communication and coordination of contractors
with military personnel, and defective managerial systems within both
the DOD and military services produce this unavoidable conclusion. 69
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both embraced
outsourcing as a way to help downsize the military." President Bush
identified outsourcing as one of his five top government-wide priori-
ties. 71 Congress adopted bipartisan caps on the number of civil ser-
vants employed by the government—but did not limit the number of
persons who could be employed through contracts with private com-
panies." For nearly a decade this has allowed policymakers to hide
from public view the true size of the government." Many of the func-
tions the government could outsource involve not only commercial
activities such as transportation, laundry, and food services, but also
planning, policy development, managing weapon systems, and man-
aging the military workforce." President Clinton used private con-
tract employees to administer the nuclear nonproliferation agree-
ment with Russia."
That supply and demand resulted in the growth of private corpo-
rations that offered military training and assistance, including logisti-
cal services and planning, weapons management and servicing, as well
as weapons development and management of other private corpora-
68 See Gunman, supra note 30, at 323-24.
68 See Schooner, supra note 18, at 556-60.
"Guttman, supra note 30, at 330. See generally Guttman, supra note 21. For an example of
practices under the Clinton Administration, see Improving the Combat Edge Through
Outsouiring, in 11 Du, issims 30 (Mar. 1996). http://wwwdefenselink.mil/speeches/1996/
s19960301-report.hunl.
71 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE PRESIDENT'S MANAGEMENT AGENDA: FISCAL YEAR
2002 17-18 (2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/ingint.pdf.
72 Congress required agencies to inventory what work should be understood as commer-
cial and what instead is inherently governmental. OrFtor. of Mc.MT. & RunGKr, °MIS Cut.
No. A-76 (REVISED), PERFORMANCE or COMMERCIAL Acrwrry (2003), available at Imp://
www.whitehouse.goviornbicirculars/a076/a76 incl_tech_correction.pdf I hereinafter OMB
Cut. No. A-76 (REvisEn)] (regarding the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act (FAIR) of
1998); see infra note 169 (discussing departures from Circular A-76).
75 See Paul C. Light, The True Size of Government, Gov'r EXECUTIVE MAG., Jan. 1, 1999,
h ttp:/ /govexec.com/fea  tu res/ 0199/ 0199s1 .h tin.
74 Schooner, supra note 18, at 554. Sec generally Guttman, supra note 21.
75
 Guttman, supra note 30, at 335.
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tions doing business with the military: 78
 The government increasingly
turned to private individuals to perform core military tasks and to
private companies to orchestrate plans and implementation." The
private firms have strong ties to U.S. government: 78
The Pentagon and CIA have long used private contractors
for a variety of tasks, from building base infrastructure to as-
sisting with covert operations. The current siination differs
in both scope and size from past practice, most famously re-
vealed in the Iran/contra scandal. Today, the firms most
heavily involved are not CIA cut-outs but multimillion-dollar
corporations with diverse interests. Their work is imple-
mented not by foreign locals trained by the CIA but by high-
ranking U.S. military officers fresh out of the armed forces. 79
On September 10, 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
announced what he called an "all-out campaign to shift [the] Penta-
gon's resources from bureaucracy to the battlefield, from tail to the
tooth.”8° He declared that the Pentagon would be challenged to
eliminate or shift to private suppliers any but the core activities of de-
fense.8i He announced a commitment to ensure that the Pentagon
would learn from, and take advantage of, the private sector's expertise
in management, technology, and business practices. 82 The Pentagon
76 Gunman, supra note 21.
a Sec Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Speai; 51 A.F. L. REV. 1,
8 (2001). In 1999, noting that judge advocates increasingly see issues arising from the
growing numbers of contractor personnel—and nongovernmental private organizations
working alongside or near the military—Colonel Steven J. Zamparelli commented,
In] ever has there been such a reliance on nonmilitary members to accomplish tasks di-
rectly affecting the tactical success of an engagement." Id. at 3 (quoting Steven J. Zampar-
elli, Competitive Sourcing and Privatization: Contractors on the Battlefield, What Have We Signed
Up For?, 23 A.F. J. Loc. 11, 11 (1999)).
7a SILVERSTEIN, supra note 35, at xv ("[The private firms] are licensed by the State De-
partment and are staffed by former military officers—effectively serving as an extension of
foreign policy.")
79 Id. at 143.
80
 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, DOD Acquisition and Logistics Excel-
lence Week Kickoff—Bureaucracy to Battlefield (Sept. 10, 2001), Intp://www.pentagon.
gov/speeches/2001/s20010910-secdef.html.
B' Id.
82 Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld explained:
Already we have made some progress. We've eliminated sonic 31 of the 72 ac-
quisition-related advisory boards. We now budget based on realistic estimates.
We're improving the acquisition process. We're investing $400 million in pub-
lic-private partnerships for military housing. Many utility services to military
installations will be privatized.
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delivered $300 billion worth of contracts to private military industries
between 1992 and 2002.° It has even outsourced security at Army
bases within the United States. 84
When the work of national defense dramatically increased after
9/11, Pentagon reliance on private military companies escalated.°
Private contractors played key roles in the U.S. war in Afghanistan.°
They served in paramilitary units with the Central Intelligence
Agency (the "CIA") that hit the ground before other combat troops;
they maintained combat equipment, provided logistical support, and
worked with surveillance and targeting plans. Currently, private con-
tracts are part of the military operation trying to locate Osama bin
Ladin.87 Major Gary Tallman, an Army spokesman, acknowledged the
unprecedented level of outsourcing since 9/11 and commented,
"[t] he Army is much smaller than in the past. When you run out of
soldiers and they don't have an expertise, one way to get that capabil-
ity on the battlefield is to contract it."88
Before the war in Iraq started, the Army announced that it would
permit contractors to compete for 154,910 civilian jobs—more than
half of its civilian workforce—as well as 58,727 military positions.°
Economist and columnist Paul Krugman observes that the Bush ad-
ministration has privatized everything in sight in Iraq, including
guards for U.S. installations, interrogators, and other seemingly cen-
tral military functions. 90 Privatization at the DOD and the armed serv-
ices has come to mean buying the time of people who work alongside
Pentagon officials and troops on the ground. These people do, as Dan
Guttman puts it, "what citizens consider the stuff of government:
planning, policy writing, budgeting, intelligence gathering, nation
We're tightening the requirements for other government agencies to re-
imburse us for detailees, and we're reviewing to see whether we should sus-
pend assignments where detailees are not fully reimbursed.
We have committed $100 million for financial modernization, and we're
establishing a Defense Business Board to tap outside expertise as we move to
improve the department's business practices.
Id.
Editorial, War-Mart, Sr. Louts POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 18, 2003, at 30.
64 Id.
65 Singer, supra note 15.
86 Id.
67 Id.
86 David Washburn Sc Bruce V. Bigelow, Debate on Military Contractors Heats Up, SAN DI-
EGO UNION-TRIB., May 7, 2004, at Al.
89 Guttman, supra note 21.
99 Schooner, supra note 18, at 553 (quoting Paul Krugman).
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building,"91 but under the employment relationship of a temporary
worker. After research and development and aircraft, the third largest.
category for military expenditures on contracted work recently has
been for "professional, administrative and management support serv-
ices."92 In a letter to the Congressional Armed Services Committee on
May 4, 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld estimated there
were 20,000 private security workers in the DOD's employment in
Iraq, which would make these private workers easily the largest
group—larger than the British deployment—working alongside the
U.S. military.93
Immediate benefits are clear. A private company can handpick
the team for a given project, and reassemble or disassemble the team
when the job is done or changes. A private company can hire and
send twenty former colonels, while the U.S. Army would have to "strip
more than an entire combat division to muster that many," observed
Colonel Bruce Grant of the Institute for National Strategic Studies. 94
This kind of nimbleness is especially difficult for the DOD in its
deployment of its civilian workers, even though they increasingly per-
form key roles in defense policy, intelligence, acquisitions, and
weapon system maintenance. 95 By depending on private companies,
the military can obtain the newest technology and the staffs trained to
maintain it—and even avoid the costs of retraining simply by shifting
to a new team. But the heavy reliance on private contractors for both
the enormous scale of work underway and for management, plan-
ning, and even supervision of other contracts raises questions at the
91 Guttman, supra note 21.
92 Id. These expenditures more than doubled over the past decade. Id.
93 Ante, supra note 21, at 76; sec Singer, supra note 15 (estimating 15,000-20,000 con-
tract workers in Iraq); see also Robert Collier, Global Security Firms Fill in As Private Armies,
S.F. CIIRON., Mar. 28, 2004, at Al (estimating 15,000 private security agents were employed
by 25 private security firms in Iraq in 2004).
94 SILVERSTEIN, supra note 35, at 167.
95 Describing these functions performed by the civilian employees of DOD, a 2003 study
by the GAO (then called the General Accounting Office, renamed the Government Ac-
countability Office in 2004) observed that such deployment was impossible for the Depart-
ment of Defense when it came to its civilian workforce because even it did not include data
on the skills and competencies needed to successfully accomplish future missions; therefore,
DOD and the components risk not being able to put the right people, in the right place, and
at the right time," nor did it include how to integrate the civilian employees with their mili-
tary counterparts or sourcing initiatives. ILLS. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-475, DOD
PERSONNEL: DOD ACTIONS NEEDED To STRENGTHEN CIVILIAN HUMAN CAPITAL S'RATEGIC
PLANNING AND INTEGRATION WITH MILEEARY PERSONNEL AND SOURCING DECISIONS Exec.
Sum. (2003), available at http://www.gao.govinewitems/d03475.1x1f [hereinafter GAO-03-
475).
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most basic level about whether anyone knows what the private con-
tractors are doing." Are the contractors doing what they promised to
do? Ensuring that the contracted work is performed, and performed
without fraud, overcharging, or mismanagement, turns out to require
clear and consistent oversight.97 Yet this seems precisely what has been
missing certainly during the Iraq war period, but with clear signs of
serious problems long before. 98
Management and oversight problems of two sorts appear to be
growing to staggering proportions for the U.S. military: 1) failures of
basic oversight and management of specific existing contracts both
reflecting and resulting in confused lines of authority and account
ability;99 and 2) widespread departures from established contracting
processes due not only to exigencies of emergency but also to conven-
ience and inattention, with disregard for established distinctions be-
tween inherently governmental and nongovernmental functions.'"
A. Failures of Basic Oversight to Ensure Contract Enforcement
Managing contracts may seem a nicety in the middle of a war, but
when the contracts concern deployment of weaponry, security forces,
and interrogators, that excuse seems less convincing. At the Abu
Ghraib prison, military personnel did not receive guidance about how
to use contracted personnel and did not know the terms of the con-
tracts nor their procedures.'m Whatever else may be said about Abu
Ghraib, this lack of clarity about contract workers and military is not
anomalous. The Government Accountability Office (the "GAO")
found the same problem in the Balkans in 2000; military officers were
confused about whether they could control the actions of contractors,
and this lack of understanding was a major factor in the government's
inability to control adequately contract costs.'"
" See Guttman, supra note 21.
97 Sec U.S. GFIN, ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-615, DOD BUSINESS SYSTEM MODERNI-
ZATION: BILLIONS CONTINUE TI) BE INVESTED WMI INADEQUATE MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT
AND ACCOUNThBILIFY 3 (2004), available at littp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04615.pdf
[hereinafter GAO-04-615]; Schooner, supra note 18, at 572.
98 See GA0-04-615, supra note 97, at 3; Schooner, supra note 18, at 572; infra notes 101-
02.
99 See infra notes 101-49 and accompanying text.
ton See infra notes 150-78 and accompanying text.
191 Schooner, supra note 18, at 563-64 (discussing the Fay Report).
102 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-00-225, CONTINGENCY OPERA'I'IONS:
ARMY SHOULD DO MORE TO CONTROL CONTRACT COSTS IN THE BALKANS 21 (2000), avail-
able at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00225.pdf  [hereinafter GAO/NS1AD-00-225]
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It is difficult to administer a contract when the contracting officer
has no representative on site, yet this is the case with many DOD con-
tracts." Even if the lines of authority clearly locate the civilian con-
tractor employees under military command, these civilians do not
face the same rewards and sanctions as do the members of the mili-
tary, and other kinds of sanctions for misbehavior are limited and re-
mote." The Fay Report, following the abuses in Abu Ghraib, con-
cluded that a properly trained contracting officer's representative
must be on site to prevent a recurrence of that situation." Congress
adopted the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to allow prosecu-
tions of contractors for offenses occurring while deployed if those of-
fenses would be felonies in the United States, but this is a very limited
tool for holding the line against misconduct far from home."
The contract enforcement failures at the DOD are pervasive and
basic.m Its financial management and related business operations,
when reviewed by the GAO, show persistent fundamental failures that
produce waste and inadequate accountability and threaten its mis-
sion." Specifically asking whether the DOD has adequate capacity to
oversee contracts for logistic support across the military services, the
GAO found that the contractors proved responsive when reviewed,
but generally received inadequate reviews in part because insufficient
numbers of appropriately trained military staff were on hand to pro-
vide effective oversight and also because many military units lacked
understanding of their role in directing and monitoring the work of
contractors." In another study in 2004, the GAO concluded that the
fundamental flaws in the DOD's business systems affect the effective-
(cited in Rebecca Rafferty Vernon, Battlefield Contractors: Facing the Tough Issues. 33 Pull.
Corr'''. L.J. 369,385-86 (2004)).
StrSchooner, supra note 18, at 557-58.
1°' SceSinger, supra note 15.
1 °5 Fay Report, supra note 17, at 47; Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1, at 17 (testimony of
Steve Schooner, Co-Director, Government Procurement Law Program, George Washington
University Law School).
106 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67 (2000); Fay Report,
supra note 17, at 50.
107 See Gunman, supra note 30, at 323-24 (discussing high-level official admissions of
agency-wide deficiencies and GAO reports).
108 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-140T, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE:
FURTHER ACTIONS ARE NEEDED '1'0 EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS BUSINESS MANAGEMENT PROB-
LEMS AND OVERCOME KEY BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION CHALLENGES 1 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/newitems/d05190t.pdf  [hereinafter GAO-05-140T].
169 U.S. Gov't' ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-854, MILITARY OPERATIONS: DOD's
EXTENSIVE USE OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT CONTRACTS REQUIRES STRENGTHENED OVERSIGHT 4
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04854.pdf  [hereinafter GAO-044354J.
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ness of the agency and contribute to fraud, waste, and abuse)" Yet
the government rarely suspends contractors, even for misconduct,
overcharging, and other violations,'"
In effect confirming Secretary Rumsfeld's 2001 call to revolution-
ize the DOD bureaucracy, the GAO has documented several prob-
lems: year-long delays in processing security clearances for contractor
employees (with failures by individual military services to respect the
security clearances granted by another service)," 2 inadequate infor-
mation and no coordinated plan to assess whether various efforts to
promote small businesses in the procurement activities could work,'"
and millions of dollars in payment adjustments for mistaken billing." 4
The DOD does not follow the best commercial practices in managing
service contracts by analyzing spending patterns to enable savings." 5
The DOD also fails to use value engineering to control costs in weap-
ons until it is too late to make substantial savings." 6 Logistical support
contracts used by several of the armed forces with good results in ear-
lier periods have been marred during the recent Iraq efforts by in-
adequate oversight, poor definition of terms, and failed cost contain-
men t. 117
110 GAO-04-615, supm note 97, at 3.
ul Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1, at 20 (testimony of Danielle Brian).
112 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-04-632, DOD PERsoNNET. CLF.ARANCES: Aunt-
Ttormt. STEPS CAN BE TAKEN TO REDUCE BACKLOGS AND DELAYS IN DETERMINING SECU-
RITY CLEARANCE ELIGIBILITY FOR INDUSTRY PERSONNEL 3 (2004), available at
hitp://www.gao.gov/newitems/d04632,pdf [hereinafter GAO-04 -632].
113 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-381, CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: DOD NEEDS
MEASURES FOR SMALL BUSINESS SUBCONTRACTING PROGRAM AND BF:TFER DATA ON FOREIGN
SuncoNTuncrs 2-3 (2004), available at littp://www.gao.gov/newitems/d04381.pdf  [herein.
after GAO-04-381].
114 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-03-727, DOD CONTRACT PAYMENTS: MAN-
AGEMENT ACTION NEEDED TO REDUCE BILLIONS IN ADJUSTMENTS TO CONTRACT PAYMENT
REcoitns 28 (2003), available at hup://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/
gao/d03727.pdf [hereinafter GAO-03-727].
113 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING Orrict, GAO-03-661, BEST PRACTICES: IMPROVED KNOWL-
EDGE or DOD SERVICE CONTRACTS COULD REVEAL. SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS 3 (2003), avail-
able at hitp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/gao/d03661.pdf  [hereinaf-
ter GAO-03-6611.
116 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-03-590R, USE OF VALUE ENGINEERING IN DE-
FENSE AcquismoNs 2 (2003), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/
report/gao/d03590r.pdf [hereinafter GAO-03-590R].
117 GAO-04-854, supra note 109, at Highlights. The report notes:
In its contingency operations since the early 1990s, the Department of De-
fense (DOD) has relied extensively on logistics support contractors to provide
many of the supplies and services needed by deployed U.S. forces. As re-
quested, GAO assessed DOD's planning in its use of logistics support con-
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The form of some government contracts itself renders cost man-
agement difficult. Share-in-savings contracts allow the contractor who
develops a system for the government to share in the savings the sys-
tem is supposed to generate. 118
 Yet it is difficult to measure such sav-
ings. 119
 The lack of caps in these contracts exposes the government to
potentially limitless demands for payment by the contractors, and
questionable accounting practices used with these contracts exacer-
bate these problems.m
Some problems with contract oversight arc not new with the war
in Iraq and substantially pre-date the Bush Administration."I The
GAO reported confusion by Army officers over whether they could
control the actions of contractors in the Balkans in 2000, given the
performance-based nature of the contract. 122 Years of reports docu-
ment problems with Los Alamos, the weapons facility run under con-
tract by the University of California. 123 Repeatedly losing classified
and sensitive material and technology, more than three-quarters of
the security personnel there also failed tests of required skills and
were unable to demonstrate abilities to arrest intruders or shoot with
tracts in contingency operations; determined whether DOD has had contract
oversight processes that are adequate to ensure that quality services were pro-
vided in an economical and efficient manner; and assessed the extent to
which DOD provided trained personnel qualified to oversee its contractors.
GAO focused its efforts on four logistics support contracts chosen because of
their size and chosen to represent more than one military service—the
Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) and Balkans Sup-
port Contract, the Navy's Construction Capabilities Augmentation Program,
and the Air Force's Contract Augmentation Program.
DOD did not have sufficient numbers of trained personnel in place to
provide effective oversight of its Logistics support contractors. The Army has
deployed units responsible for supporting the LOGCAP contract, but some of
the personnel have little knowledge of the contract. The Air Force did not
consistently train evaluators to monitor its logistics support contractor's per-
formance. Military units across the services receiving contractor support have
lacked a comprehensive understanding of their roles and responsibilities,
which include establishing the work to be done by contractors and monitor-
ing contractors' performance.
Id.
lla Jason Miller, Former OFPP Head Warns Agencies About Risks of Sham-in-Savings Contracts,
Gov'• COMPUTER NEws, Nov. 12, 2004, http://wwwgcn.com/voil_nol/daily-updates/27887-
1.htm1 (describing comments by Angela Styles, former head of the Office of Federal Procure-
ment Policy).
119 Id.
12° Id.
121 See infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text,
122 GAO/NS1AD-00-225, supra note 102, at 21.
129 Sce Kenay Davidson, Lapses at Labs Go Back Decades, S.F. CI1RON., Aug. 1,2004, at Al.
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accuracy. 124 But the deeper problem is the failure of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy—after years of repeated complaints, congressional
investigations, and reports—to deMand accountability of the contract
ing parties, whether nonprofit institutions like universities or for-
profit companies. 125 To demand accountability is either to secure
compliance or else find the contractors in breach, unworthy of pay-
ment, or renewal. To hold contractors accountable requires knowl-
edge of what they have clone, and if they have failed to perform ade-
quately, then to replace them with another contractor or else to take
the tasks back in-house.
Problems with contract monitoring may have been most acute
during the Iraq war, and they did not much improve despite infusions
of resources and the passage of time. 126 Steven Schooner attributes
this to a failure to recruit aggressively the staff necessary to manage
the contracting responsibilities. 127 The DOD repeatedly has failed to
hold private contractors accountable for their performance of Multi-
million dollar contracts in Iraq. 128
Not only are there major examples of overcharging and failures
to perform, illustrated by the Congressional and media investigations
of I-Ialliburton, but there is the more fundamental failure of the DOD
itself to manage and enforce the contracts. 129 The Office of the In-
spector General issued a 2004 report on the Coalition contracts in
Iraq and found not only missing and incomplete records, but an inef-
124 Ste id,
125 See id.
126 Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1, at 18 (testimony of Steve Schooner). Congress called
upon the DOD to devise a plan to supervise the private security companies and monitor
human rights violations, overcharging, and quality. DOD has missed the deadline. Sec Ber-
gner, supra note 39, at 54.
127 See generally Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1.
128 A contracting officer who told Congress that Halliburton was abusing the contract-
ing protocol faced a demotion; some viewed this as retaliation. See T. Christian Miller,
Democrats Demand Probe of Demotion, L.A. Timis, Aug. 30. 2005, at A8 (describing treatment
of flunnatine Greenhouse); Mark A. Stein, Indictments and Statistics All Overwhelmed by Trag-
edy Down South, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2005, at C3 (same).
129 DOD and the Army also lack sufficient controls when it acts as a seller of military
technology, resulting in the shipment of classified materials to countries not cleared for re-
ceipt of such information. Apparently, the Army does not even have a method for retrieving
materials shipped to countries ineligible to receive classified materials. U.S. GEN. AccouNT-
INt OFFIcE, GAO-04-327, FOREIGN MILITARY* SALES: IMPROVED ARMS. CONTROLS COULD
PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED SHIPMENTS OF CLASSIFIED SPARE PARTS AND ITEms CONTAINING
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 'to FOREIGN COUNTRIES 3 (2004), available at lutp://www.gpoaccess.
gov/gaoreports/ (enter 'GA0-04-327" in "2004 GAO Reports Only") [hereinafter GAO-04-
327].
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fective system for contract review, tracking, and monitoring)" Again,
the lack of transparent information about all of this makes assessment
necessarily incomplete, but the failure to obtain sufficient informa-
tion apparently runs all the way to the DOD, which lacks basic infor-
mation about how many private contract employees are on the
ground in Iraq, the specific tasks each are to perform, and if they are
in fact performing those tasks."' This means that the DOD simply is
defaulting on its contractual role as the paying, bargaining partner.
The DOD also relies heavily on contracts with private companies
to monitor other private contracts)" For example, Aegis was hired as
the coordinating hub for more than 50 other private security compa-
nies in Iraq; it provides its own force of heavily armed protection
teams to oversee reconstruction efforts, but also oversees the work of
the other companies under a contract worth $293 million (£163m) ►"
The award to Aegis became a lightning rod. Former British army
officer, Lieutenant Colonel Tim Spicer, heads Aegis)" He com-
manded and defended two soldiers charged and convicted with a
murder in Northern Belfast)" He also previously directed a company
that sold arms to Sierra Leone in violation of a United Nations em-
bargo)" The particular worries about him or his company should not
obscure the larger problem: how well can one company monitor an-
other in advancing governmental purposes? Such an arrangement is
doomed if there are no clear guidelines and no sustained monitoring
by the government of the oversight process itself.'"
In the Iraq war, the DOD has relied heavily on contractors who
in turn subcontracted)" At a Congressional hearing about Hallibur-
is° OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL. COALITION PROVISIONAL. AU'llIORITY REPORT No.
04-013, COALITION PROVISION AUTHORITY'S CONTRACTING PROCESSES LEADING UP TO
AND INCLUDING CONTRACT AWARD (2004) (cited in Schooner, supra note 18, at 558).
131 See generally Singer, supra note 15.
132 See Severin Carrell, Spicer Cleared to Pursue £160m Iraq Contract, INDEF. (London),
Sept. 19, 2004, at 2.
133 Id.
134 See id.
135 Family Lobbies over U.S. Contract, husil TimEsdune 18, 2004, at 8.
136 Id. The GAO rejected a challenge to the award of the contract brought by rival
DynCorp, which pointed out Spicer's involvement in violating an arms embargo. Jimmy
Burns & Thomas CaL-In, DynCorp Seeks to Overturn Iraq Security Contract: Dispute Over Award to
Company Headed by Controversial Former British Army Office); FIN. TIMES (London), July 22,
2004, at 8.
137 The downsizing of the Department of Defense's workforce dedicated to acquisi-
tions coincided with the expanded use of outsourcing. Sce David A. Whiteford, Negotiated
Procurements: Squandering the Benefit of the Bargain, 32 Put. CoNT. U. 509, 555 (2003).
198 Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1, at 12.
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ton cost-overruns and inefficiencies, one of the witnesses, Marie
deYoung, was an employee of Halliburton and a former army cap-
tain.'" Marie deYottng testified that Halliburton subcontracted to
companies that in turn subcontraCted, producing two or three layers
of subcontracts. 14° She concluded, "kyle, essentially, lost control of
the project and paid between four to nine times what we needed to
fund that project." 141 An element of the scandal around Halliburton
was its own failure to act promptly in paying its subcontractors who in
turn faced bankruptcy and even threatened to stop performance—
putting the security and effectiveness of the troops in jeopardy. 142 The
heavy reliance on subcontractors and on contractors to monitor other
contractors may result from reductions in the government's own ac-
quisition workforce—a legacy of the downsizing movement. 145 Steven
Schooner concludes, "[t] he government has no choice at this point
but to enter into larger, more complicated contracts, because they
don't have enough people to manage the contracts. So we're being
penny wise and pound foolish by not stalling up our acquisition
workforce. "144
The stream of studies by the GAO—as requested by members of
Congress—offers some spot checks." 5 Those checks, however, raise
alarms about. Pentagon failures to monitor contract. performance. Re-
views from the outside, by the GAO, Inspectors General of other de-
partments, or the media, show failures to ensure cost-effectiveness
and achievement of DOD purposes—and also failures to gather and
review information sufficiently to permit ongoing contract over-
sight.."° The promise of cheaper and more efficient services at the
heart. of privatization in any field bears little relationship to reality in
the military context where competition is difficult or impossible to
139 Id. at 10.
14° Id. at 12.
141 Id. (testimony of Marie delbung).
Ha Id. at 13 ("All Halliburton had to do was to negotiate reasonable prices and then
pay its subcontracts for services rendered. But many of these vendors were not paid for
mouths for a year at a time.").
Ks See Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1, at 33.
144 Id. (testimony of Steve Schooner).
145 See, e.g., GAO-03-661, supra note 115, at 3, 6; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-
03-574T, SOURCING AND AcQutsrrioN: CHALLENGES FACING TuE DEentrrmENT Or DEFENSE
1 (2003), available at littp://www.gao.govinew.items/d03574t.pdf [hereinafter GAO-O3-
5747'] .
146 See GAO-03.661, supra note 115, at 3, 6; GAO-03-574T, supra note 145, at 1. On fail-
ures to even secure the data that would allow control and management see Guttman, supra
note 21.
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sustain and where the private industry rather than the contracting
government actors calls the shots." 7 When the government is the sole
purchaser, and a handful of contractors dominate the field, it is
difficult to bar or suspend a major contractor and often difficult even
to get the contractors to perform and document their costs."B Ironi-
cally, as the Iraq war unfolded, the GAO changed its name from the
General Accounting Office to the Government Accountability Office,
just as the proliferating privatization of the military made government
accountability newly elusive. 149 It almost has an Orwellian quality; if
we declare there is an office of accountability, there is accountabil-
ity—yet the GAO reports repeatedly expose the failures of account-
ability within the DOD.
B. Failures to Comply with Contracting Processes
Several critics of private contracting by the DOD focus not on the
DOD's failures to manage and enforce particular contracts, but on its
departure from the norms and standards of established contracting
processes. 150 Given the urgency of the situation in Iraq, Congress
permitted waivers and irregularities in established procurement pro-
cedures, 151 just as Congress authorized the Department of Homeland
Security to pilot the use of acquisition agreements that departed from
the usual government contract procedures. 152 With Hallihurton, the
irregularities were justified because of the exigent circumstances—
and also by claims that it was the only company with the relevant ex-
perience)" Yet subsequent evidence indicated that another company
had equal, if not superior, experience.'" Overall, the Policy Adminis-
147 Ann R. Markusen, The Case Against Privatizing National Security, 16 GOVERNANCE 471,
471 (2003).
148 See Guttman, supra note 30, at 344.
149 Stephen Barr, GAO Gets New Name, Permission to Launch New Compensation System,
WAsii. PosT, July 12, 2004, at B2; John Kelly, Answer Man: Name That Agency, WAsn. Nisi,
Mar. 14, 2005, at C11.
15° See Schooner, supra note 18, at 564-65.
151
 Contract and Fiscal Law Developments of 2003—The Year in Review: Appendix A: Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) Legislation for Fiscal Year 2004, ARMY LAWYER, 199 (Major J. litlyser
ed., 2004).
152 U,S, GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-05-136, flomELAND SECURITY: FURTHER
ACTION NEEDED TO PROMOTE SUCCESSFUL USE or SPECIAL 1)1-IS ACQUISITION Aumourry
1-2 (2004), available at http://gao.gmlnewitems/d05136.pdf [hereinafter GAO-05-136]
(detailing the authority granted in the Homeland Security Act of 2002).
153 Singer, supra note 15.
154 Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1, at 6 (comment by Rep. Waxman describing
Bechtel); id. at 8 (testimony of Sheryl Tappan, former Bechtel Proposal Manager) ("In my
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trator of the Office of Federal Procurement observed as she left office
in September 2003, "[L] here is still not a lot of oversight in some areas
of our contracting system, and I think it. will haunt us." 155
The contracts involved in the Abu Ghraib abuses proceed
through an end-run around standard contracting procedures—an
end-run that turns out to be well-trod. 156 Agencies can streamline the
purchasing process by paying a fee to a program manager in another
agency, which in turn can select a favored contractor without a com-
petitive bid. 157 This shortcut permits sole-source awards and is sup-
posed to separate programmatic authority from procurement author-
ity, but also permits an agency to bypass procedural restrictions within
its own department.. 158 Steven Schooner worries that, as a result, pro-
curement is often accomplished by an agency working for the fee
rather than results. 159 The Inspector General for the Department of
Interior concluded that chasing fees distorted the judgment of pro-
curement officials. 160
These interagency task-order service contracts were routed
through the Department of Interior and the General Service Admini-
stration (the "GSA") in contracts for interrogation, intelligence, and
security services in Iraq without establishing clear content or monitor-
ing for those contracts.m This approach may exempt the contractors
from exposure to criminal liability that otherwise would attach
through the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 162 Alerted to
these departures from checks and controls in the contracting process,
the Defense Inspector General reviewed twenty-four contracts
awarded between February and August 2003 by DOD and found that
eighteen were awarded through the GSA supply schedule approach,
12 years doing government proposals, I had never seen anything as arrogant, as egregious
as the ways in which Pentagon officials, in particular Corps of Engineer contracting staff at
the Fort Worth district, treated the bidders, how they ignored our federal laws and regula-
tions and the procedures that I still believe normally ensure fair play.").
155 Guttman, supra note 30, at 331 (quoting Angela Styles).
156 See Schooner, nipm note 18, at 564-70.
157 Id. at 569.
'68 See id. at 564-69.
159
 Id. at 568.
16° Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1, at 19 (testimony of Steve Schooner).
161 See Schooner, supra note 18, at 570; Guttman, supra note 21.
162 Schooner, supra note 18, at 570 (citing the Fay Report and the Military Extmterri-
torial Jurisdiction Act).
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bypassing procurement rules, and thirteen lacked adequate surveil-
lance. 163
Experiments in streamlined contracting processes also have al-
lowed the military to pay contractors for a flexible delivery order
rather than specifying detailed agreement by contract.'" The De-
partment of Interior's Inspector General investigating the Abu Ghraib
situation reported that CACI, a private contractor, was given six orders
predominantly for interrogation, intelligence, and security services in
Iraq.' 65
 Reviewing this situation, Dan Guttman at the Center for Pub-
lic Integrity concluded that neither his own research nor review by the
GSA "could find any existing schedule that provided for these serv-
ices." 166
 Apparently, no one had checked to determine whether the
contract work at Abu Ghraib was permitted or authorized, no one
monitored the steps leading to hiring those individuals and directing
their behavior, and no one determined whether those tasks were sup-
posed to be contracted out at al1. 167
Yet involving private individuals in interrogations and intelli-
gence activities crosses the line into centrally governmental work. 168 A
longstanding executive policy, now expressed in Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (the "OMB") Circular No. A-76, directs that inher-
ently governmental functions should not be outsourced. 169 In 1998,
Congress adopted a statute requiring agencies to inventory civil serv-
ice work and to identify jobs as commercial or inherently governmen-
163 Guttman, supra note 21 (citing Inspector General report). In addition, a "blanket
purchase agreement -
 allows one government department to add to another department's
existing contract with a vendor and, in so doing, avoid bidding out the new and potentially
unrelated services. See Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic,
and Strategic Problems with Privatising War, 82 WAsn. U. L.Q. 1001, 1068 n.226 (2004); Mary
14. Cooper, Private Affairs: New Reliance on America's Other Army, 62 Conic. Q. WKLY REP.
2194 (2004).
164 Schooner, supra note 18, at 564.
163 Guttman, supra note 21.
166 Id.
167 Id.; see also Guttman, supra nate 30, at 340.
166 Guttman, supra note 21.
166 See generally OMB Cnt. No. A-76 (REvIscu), supra note 72. This document includes
a categorization of governmental activities into commercial and inherently governmental.
Inherently governmental jobs would be those 'so intimately related to the public interest
as to mandate performance by government personnel." Id. at A-2. Additionally, functions
may be Inherently governmental" where they involve discretion and sovereign authority
that could bind the U.S. and "[slignicantly affecttl the life, liberty, or property of private
persons." Id.
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tal in order to assist the privatization effort. 17° A GAO report in 2002
indicated that the government. should retain for its own workers cer-
tain tasks of "wartighting, judicial, enforcement, regulatory, and poli-
cymaking functions." 171 Nevertheless, disagreements over precisely
what an inherently governmental activity is and gaps in governmental
capacity contribute to ambiguity over what can or should be outsottr-
ced. 172
 For example, a private contractor may be entrusted with pro-
viding security, as well as driving trucks to transport soldiers, equip-
ment, and food, but when does this function move from civilian
support to core military activity? 173 The Department of Defense has
not adopted nor consistently applied measures to identify and track
what functions should remain within the government and what can be
outsourced. 174 The DOD increasingly spends billions of dollars in pri-
vate contracts without clarifying or monitoring this policy. 175
In its recent consideration of these issues, the government of
Great Britain concluded that "lit.1 he distinction between combat and
non-combat. operations is often artificial. The people who fly soldiers
170 Federal Activities Inventory Reform ("FAIR") Act of 1998, 31 U.S.C. § 501 (2000)
(stating that in using the private sector for needed commercial services, officials are to
identify savings and also identify noninherently governmental functions to enable cost
comparisons between private bids and public budgets); see Maj. Mary E. Harney, The Quid
Revolution: Downsizing, Outsourcing, and Best Value, 158 MIL. L. Rt:v. 48, 61-92 (1998) (de-
scribing FAIR, Circular A-76, and the competitive cost comparison process); see also Die-
bold v. United States, 947 F.2d 787, 789-90 (Gth Cir. 1991) (finding the Army's decision to
contract out food services was required by federal procurement law because the private
company could provide the services at a lower cost than the DOD cost).
171 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-847T, COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES
PANEL: IMPROVING '1'111: SOURCING DECISIONS OF 'HIE GOVERNMENT: FINAL REPORT 7
(2002), available at wwsv.gao.gov/new.items/d02847t.pdf [hereinafter GAO.02-84'TM see
Schooner, supra note 18, at 555-56.
172 Sec Schooner, supra note 18, at 556 n.22 (describing fights within the government
over outsourcing what may be inherently governmental functions). The official Pentagon
statement is that private security companies "are not being used to perform inherently
military functions." Bergner, supra note 39, at 32 (quoting an "'officially approved written
statement'").
173 See Schooner, supra note 18, at 553-54. "Just as the distinction between combat
arms and non-combat arms has become blurred during operations, the distinction be-
tween 'advising' and 'doing' for these contractors is similarly blurred," states Major Tho-
mas Milton of the Foreign Area Officer Association. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 35, at 166.
Ken Silverstein writes: "Whe reality is that most of these corporations' operations become
an integral part of the foreign government's military capability." Id. Although Silverstein
was writing about private military companies working for foreign governments, the points
would seem to hold for the relationship between such companies and our government and
military, too. Eroding or elusive, the distinctions between noncombat and combat and
between advising and doing are difficult to track and monitor. SccSinger, supm note 15.
"Schooner. supra note 18, at 555-56.
175 See id. at 555-57; Singer, supra note 15.
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and equipment to the battlefield are as much a part of the military
operation as those who do the shooting."176
 A contractor may be hired
to support a complex technological weapons system, which may be an
unmanned surveillance aircraft and support for it may include its de-
ployment. If so, has the surveillance and deployment of that aircraft
become an inherently governmental function? Is interrogation an in-
herently governmental task?'" What if the government lacks
sufficient knowledge of the subject's language to engage in effective
interrogation while a contract employee may have that knowledge?
We do not even have to reach—at least not yet—the difficult.
philosophic question about what should be viewed as an inherently
governmental activity, sheltered from contracting out, in order to
conclude that the current governmental practices fail to provide
sufficient monitoring even to attend to that question. Whatever the
line is or should be, there must be sufficient government resources
and attentiveness to monitor it and to review outsourced functions. 178
That, at minimum, is an inherently governmental task.
II. FURTHER JEOPARDY TO THE MILITARY, THE NATION, AND
DEMOCRACY
The reliance on contractors—even if subject to adequate oversight
and appropriate procurement practices—risks jeopardy to the quality
of military activities, the national interest, and democratic values.
A. Jeopardy to the Military
Investigation of the abuses in Abu Ghraib revealed that private
contractor employees "wandered about with too much unsupervised
free access in the detainee area." 179 The situation in Abu Ghraib, one
hopes, was anomalous in many respects. Abu Ghraib did, however,
also expose problems that arise with the command structure, disci-
178 NINTH REPORT OF '111E FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE: PRIVATE MILITARY COMPA-
NIES, SESSION 2001-2002, RESPONSE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COM-
NIONWEA1:111 ACTIVITIES (Great Britain) 4 (Oct. 2002); RETURN TO AN ADDRESS OF THE
HONOURABLE TitE HOUSE OF COMMONS, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR
REGULATION (Great Britain) 8 (Feb. 12, 2002).
177 Dan Guttman reports that although the Army concluded that intelligence work is
inherently governmental, it did not bar contractors from that work in the Contractors on the
Battlefield field manual used in Abu Ghraib. Guttman, supra note 21.
' 78
 See GAO-02-847T, supra note 171, at 2-4.
179 Washburn & Bigelow, supra note 88, at Al (quoting the report by Army Maj. Gen.
Antonio M. Taguba, who led the investigation at Abu Ghraib).
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pline, accountability, security, and predictability when personnel
working together include members of the military and private con-
tract employees. 180 This is precisely the situation established when the
military contracts out logistical planning and support as it has in
Iraq. 181 Marie deYoung, former U.S. Army captain and former em-
ployee of Halliburton, observed the loss of control produced by layers
of contracting and subcontracting, and the confusion over lines of
authority and measures of accountability. 182
Congress adopted the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to
allow the prosecution of contractors in the United States for offenses
occurring while they are deployed abroad, but only if the conduct
would be a felony if committed in the United States. 133 Congress
adopted this law after U.S. military and local Bosnian law enforce-
ment found they had no ability to prosecute employees of DynCorp
apparently engaged in human sex trafficking, 184 Through the prosti-
tution ring, employees of DynCorp "purchased" young women and
children to serve as their sexual slaves. 185 Once the practice was ex-
posed, the company fired the individuals involved—but there were no
prosecutions for statutory rape, human trafficking, or anything under
military, Bosnian, or U.S. law. 186 The U.S. military uses this same com-
pany to train the Iraqi police. 187 Members of the military can face swift
court marshals, but civilian contractors fall outside that jurisdiction
and elude any domestic legal system as well. 188 A whistleblower lost
188 See Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1, at 18.
181 See id. at 10-13.
182 Id. at 12 (testimony of Marie delOung).
183 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67 (2000). See generally
Michael]. Davidson, Runk Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with Civilian Con-
tractors on the Battlefield, 29 Putt. Corm U. 233 (2000).
184 Robert Capps, Crime Without Punishment, Sm.org.com , June 27, 2002, http://
www.salon.com/news/feature/2002/06/27/military/ [hereinafter Capps, Crime Without
Punishment): Robert Capps, Outside the Law, SALoti.co&t, June 26, 2002, http://archive.sa
lon.com/news/feature/2002/06/26/bosnia/ [hereinafter Capps, Outside the Law].
106 See Capps, Crime Without Punishment, supra note 189; Capps, Outside the Law, supra,
note 189. As Laura Dickinson has noted, this statute would not reach contractors working
with the CIA or Department of Interior unless they are running U.S. facilities overseas as
specified in a recent statutory provision. Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing
Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 Wm. & MARY L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 52, on file with author) (discussing the USA PA-
TRIOT Act of 2001, 18 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 2005)).
188 See Capps, Crime Without Punishment, supra note 184.
Is? Sec id.; Capps, Outside the Law, supra, note 184.
188 See T. Christian Miller, Contractors Fall Through Legal Cracks, L.A. TIM es, May 9, 2009,
at A8; Capps, Crime Without Punishment, supra note 184.
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her job for exposing the scandal—and later won a damages award on
that basis in Britain. 29
 If left entirely to the military, it is not obvious
that such scandals would get swift treatment. At least one civilian
officer in Bosnia was told by his military commanders to lie about the
DynCorp sex scandal, and if he had been a member of the armed
services, he would not even have been able, as he was, to quit. 19°
Yet even with the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, proce-
dures to move against civilian contractors remain unclear. 01 Its scope
may not apply to civilians who do not work directly for the govern-
ment. 192 It offers only limited control on the scene for the military
commanders or even civilian superlisors. 193 Military lawyers have been
writing for a decade about the ambiguity over what law applies to con-
tractors working in military settings. 04 The contract employees are
not governed by military discipline or norms; nor are they regulated
by rules that apply only to government actors, such as the FOIA, limits
on political activities, and conflict of interest rules. 195 Ambiguities re-
main over what law applies if contract employees are captured or in-
jured in confrontations with enemies)" Both in terms of legal
18° ,101111 Crewdson, Contractor Tries to Avert Repeat of Bosnia Woes, Sex Scandal Still Haunts
DynCorp, Ciii. TRIB., Apr. 19, 2003, at C3.
190 Dominic Hipkins, Bosnia Sex Trade Shames UN, Scomorn ON SUNDAY, Feb. 9, 2003,
at 24 (describing cover-up); Vivian Vinson, Letter to the Editor, Military Shouldn't Investi-
gate Itself, BOSTON Gums; May 5, 2004, at A10 (reporting conversation with a civilian civil
affairs officer).
191 Sec Katie Fairbank, Who Investigates Private Interrogators in Iraq? Use of Contractors to
Gather Intelligence Raises Concerns, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 7, 2004, at 22A.
192 Miller, supra note 188, at A8.
193 See Major Karen L. Douglas, Contractors Accompanying the Force: Empowering Command-
ers with Emergency Change Authority, 55 A.F. L. REV. 127, 135-36 (2004).
19+ See, e.g., id.; Major Mark R. Ruppert, Criminal Jurisdiction over Environmental Offenses
Committed Overseas: How to Maximize and When to Say "No," 40 A.F. L. REv. 1, 17-19 (1996);
Turner & Norton, supra note 77, at 25 (discussing lack of clarity over whether contractors,
unlike military, are subject to the employment, tax, and customs laws of the host nation);
see also Charles E. Cantu & Randy W. Young, The Government Contractor Defense: Breaking the
Boyle Barrier, 62 ALB. L. REv. 403, 406 (1998) (exploring liability issues); Washburn & Bige-
low, supra note 88, at Al (stating that it remains unclear whether military, U.S., or Iraqi law
applies to crimes committed by civilian contractors, and whether these civilian contractors
are subject to FOIA and direct congressional oversight).
195 Guttman, supra note 30, at 338; sec David A. Whiteford, Negotiated Procurements:
Squandering the Benefit of the Bargain, 32 l'uB. CONT. L II. 509, 542 n.226 (2003).
196 Lawyers and commentators debate whether civilian corm -actors are intended to re-
ceive prisoner-of-war status. See THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS 334-35 (Deiter Fleck ed., 1999) (discussing prisoner-of-war status); Major Char-
lotte M. Liegl-Paul, Civilian Prisoners of War: A Proposed Citizen Code of Conduct, 182 Mu.. L.
REv. 106, 113-16 (2004); Kristen McCallion, War for Sale! Battlefield Contractors in Latin
America the 'Coporatization' of America's War on Drugs, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM, L. REV. 317,
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authorization and actual competence and training, can contract em-
ployees defend themselves with force—or does that exceed their role
and jeopardize the safety of the military members working alongside
them?197 Do civilian contractors compromise the security of a mission
when they discuss troop movements in a restaurant in Baghdad?'"
The Third Geneva Convention would seem to cover combatants who
are civilians if they are under the command of a superior, wear dis-
tinctive fixed signs recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly, and
conduct themselves in accord with the laws of armed conflict, al-
though each of these elements may be ambiguous in the case of par-
ticular contract employees.' 99 But Protocol I to the Geneva Conven-
tion deprives mercenaries of the privilege of serving as lawful
combatants or immunity as prisoners of war upon capture. 2" The line
between "contract employee" and "mercenary" for this or other pur-
poses in international law remains unclear. 20
 Confusion about pre-
cisely these legal questions can lead to disorder and ineffectiveness in
actual operations, harming military effectiveness.
The military can be harmed in a different way if the option of re-
tiring to a new career with a better-paid private contractor appeals to
talented officers. Margaret. Stock, a professor at the United States Mili-
tary Academy at West Point and a reserve officer, explains how retiring
officers can benefit from entering the private sector:
Military officers may be very tempted to retire in order to
work for private military companies because the day after re-
tiring, an individual can collect. his or her retired pay, which
is typically 50% of an active duty salary, and at the same time
return to work as a consultant in essentially the same capac-
ity, but with a new salary. Such individuals perform the same
350 (2004-05); Adam Sherman, Forward unto the Digital Breach: Exploring the Legal Status of
Tomorrow's High-Tech Warriors, 5 Cm, J. !Wel. L 335, 337-39 (2004); Turner & Norton,
supra note 77, at 9; Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights
Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. ,J. INT'L L 1, 15-16 (2004).
197 See Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1, at 13 (testimony of Marie delbung).
198 Id. The for-profit entities working under contract may avoid disclosure by using the
trade secret exemption. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (2000);
Dickinson, supra note 185 (manuscript at 86).
199 Vernon, supra note 102, at 405-08.
2°° See Milliard, supra note 35, at 30-36.
291
 Even the definition of "mercenary" in international law is unclear. Sec infra note 211
and accompanying text.
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function while receiving both their retired pay and the con-
sultant salary. 202
Reliance on private sources for important tasks, such as logistics and
maintenance of advanced technological weapons, may in addition re-
lieve the military of developing those capacities internally—to the long-
term detriment of military strength. 205
 Similarly; depending upon con-
tracts for the leases of trucks and equipment without ensuring appro-
priate maintenance plans can leave the military vulnerable at crucial
movements to failures beyond their control to remedy. 204
 If the contrac-
tor in turn does not pay subcontractors—as was the case apparently
with Halliburton—vendors may grow resentful or even collapse under
ban kr uptcy. 205
Alternatively, the military also may compromise its strength by
relying through layers of subcontracts on people it. would never use
directly, or by relying on individuals from third-country nations who
are paid little and shift loyalties based on who pays them. 205 Global
military companies have recruited members of defeated armed
groups and militias as mercenaries. 207 Some of the companies do little
to screen employees. 20
 One contract employee turned out to be a
fugitive charged with embezzlement and previously convicted of as-
sault in the United States. 209 The work can attract volatile individuals.
Mercenary involvement in the Congo over decades is a notable di-
mension of the area's violence and instability. 210
202 E-mail from Margaret Stock, Associate Professor of Law, United States Military
Academy, to Martha Minow, Jeremiah Smith, Jr. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
(Oct. 20, 2005, 16:54:21 EST) (on file with author). Westerners earn between $400 and
$700 each day they work in Iraq for private security companies, whereas employees from
Fiji, Chile, and other non-Western nations earn between $40 and $150 per week. Bergner,
supra note 39, at 34.
"2 Davidson, supra note 183, at 265.
204 Id.; see Vernon, supra note 102, at 393-94 (discussing risks of contracting for main-
tenance and repair of weapon system and other military equipment).
205
 Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1, at 13 (testimony of Marie delbung).
eve
	 id,
202 Sec Singer, supra note 15.
208 See, e.g., Bergner, supra note 39, at 50.
209 Sec id.
210 See Stella Mapensauswa, Briton failed for Arms Dealings, WASH. Pos.r, Sept. 11, 2004, at
A16; Andrew Meldum, Thatcher's Son Implicated in Failed Coup, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004,
at 10; Keith Suter, Why Those Dogs of War Are Still Barking, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney,
Aunt.), Feb. 18, 2005, at 64; Singer, supra note 15 (discussing former South African sol-
diers and police recruited as guards in Iraq).
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Here the use of contractors raises the enduring question about
mercenaties.2 " Nicolo Machiavelli argued against mercenaries in his
classic work of politics, The Prince, because they work for pay. 212 Illus-
trating Machiavelli's warning that soldiers working for pay would not
take the kind of life-risking action that can turn the tide of battle,
some contractors during the Gulf War fled from a possible chemical
weapons attack. 2 " Perhaps if the contractors build a team of retired
military officers, the ethos of loyalty to the country and the military
can be sustained even among these civilian employees. 214 Yet. Machia-
velli's warnings become more powerful for other employees, and es-
pecially for low-paid employees brought in from other countries un-
der subcontracts.215
211
 There is no settled definition of a mercenary in international law. See Milliard, supra
note 35, at 19-69 (discussing alternative meanings under different international sources).
The British government has considered regulation for private military companies and tries
to distinguish mercenaries from servicemen in foreign armies and defense industrial com-
panies. NINTH REPORT, sltpra note 176, at 1-3: RETURN 'ID AN ADDRESS OF THE HONOUR-
ABLE THE HOUSE or COMMONS, supra note 176, at 7-8,22-24. The distinction might be
drawn between an individual (or group) selling combat services and an individual (or
group) selling support services to government militaries, but the increasing roles of tech-
nological and complex logistical operations make this distinction increasingly of little
significance in terms of advancing military effort. So.: RETURN TO AN ADDRESS crt."nit:
HONOURABLE •111K HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 176, at 7-8.
212 NICOL() MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (1515), reprinted in 23 GREAT BOOKS 01."111E
WESTERN WORLD 17-19 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., W.K. Marriott trans„ Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc. 1952) (arguing that mercenaries are disloyal and cowardly); sec also Tim-
cvDIDEs , THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR it1 THE LANDMARK TIRICYDIDES 67 (Robert B. Strassler
ed., Richard Crawley trans., Touchstone 1996) (quoting speech by the Corinthians assert,
ing that the weakness of Athens' army rested in the fact that it was more mercenary than
national"),
213 Vernon, supra note 102, at 394 ("During the Persian Gulf War, a small number of
contractors fearful of chemical weapon attacks fled from an air base in Saudi Arabia. While
the contractor's [sic] departure did not disrupt the operation, it highlighted potential
weaknesses. The contractor [sic) decided that financial gain was simply not worth the risk.
This highlights the major difference between military personnel and contractors: one is
present to serve his country, the other to make a profit.").
2" See id. at 394-95 (discussing contractors' arguments).
215 Machiavelli wrote:
Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his
state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are
disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends,
cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to
men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace
one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no
other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which
is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you.
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B. Jeopardy to the United States and Democracy
Reliance on private contractors also risks exposure to war
profiteering: the exploitation of the chaos and fear of wartime by
suppliers of materials to the military. Resisting war profiteering has
been a governmental goal as long as this nation has existed. 216 War
profiteering is a serious problem not only because it diverts public
monies—the money of the citizens—to private hands through over-
charging and fraud, but also because it can jeopardize peacemaking
and broader confidence in government. These issues overshadow but
should not obscure the problems of former government officials
finding employment with contractors after helping them build con-
nections with the government. 2"
Meanwhile, the revenues pouring into private military compa-
nies—the stock in publicly traded private military companies jumped
50% after 9/11—are funneled into lobbying.218 Iraq contractors llyn-
Corp, Bechtel, and Halliburton donated more than $2.2 million to
political causes—mainly Republican—between 1999 and 2002, ac-
cording to the Center for Responsive Politics. 219 Lobbying efforts by
private contractors have documented effects on policies regarding
weapons systems development. 220 It does not seem out of bounds to
wonder about the influence contractor lobbying has on foreign policy:
MAcittAvEt.u, supra note 212, at 18; see PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVEN-
TIONS OF 12 AUG. 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL.
ARMED CoNmicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://
www.ohchr.org/english/law/protocoll.htm
 (defining mercenary as one recruited to and
taking part in armed hostilities, motivated essentially by desire for material compensation
in excess of what combatants of similar ranks earn in armed forces, and not a national of a
party to the conflict or member of armed forces of a party to the conflict).
216 Seefohn Terrence A. Rosenthal & Robert T. Alter, Clear and Convincing to Whom? the
False Claims Act and Its Burden of Proof Standard: Why the Government Needs a Big Stick, 75 No-
TRE Dam: L. REV. 1409, 1449-58 (2000).
217 See Lt. Colonel Richard B. O'Keefe, Jr., Where There's Smoke . . . Who Should Bear The
Burden When a Competing Contractor Hires Former Government Employees?, 164 MIL. L. REV. 1,
2-5 (2000).
218 Publicly traded stocks in private military companies jumped roughly fifty percent,
making this one of the few industries whose economic outlook unproved after 9/11.
Singer, supra note 15; see Nelson D. Schwartz, Pentagon's Private Army, FolcruNE, Mar. 17,
2003, at 100, 102.
219 See Rupert Cornwell, et al., How the Allies Won the War; But Then Lost the Battle for
Peace, INHEI, . (London), Jan. 28, 2005, at 4; Jim Keane, Private Armies Also Fight, Sr. Louis
PosT-Disnvicii, Oct. 30, 2003, at A8. Companies with strong ties to the Bush Administra-
tion have received contracts in the efforts to rebuild after Hurricane Katrina. Bush Associ-
ates Win Disaster Relief Contracts; Special Report: After Katrina, It4ota.. (London), Sept. 11,
2005, at 18.
22° See Markusen, supra note 147, at 484-85.
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Political scientists have studied the relationship between defense
spending and domestic political goals. 221
But even more troubling is the possibility that by using private
contractors, the government can avoid checks and balances in a
democratic system. This is the caution pressed in articles by Deborah
Avant and Jon Michaels, 222 Because private contractors are obliged to
share far less information with Congress than required of the DOD or
the military, Avant argues that the administration can effectively limit
congressional checks on foreign policy. 223 She claims that the United
States can also advance its interests indirectly by licensing a private
military company to assist another government, so that the United
States itself can deny that it is actually pursuing foreign policy. 224 As an
example, she notes that "in 1994, the United States licensed U.S.
company Military Professional Resources International (MPRI) to
provide advice and training to the Croatian government. The coun-
try's president, Franjo Tudjman, received the advantages of U.S. mili-
tary' assistance, but through a private entity. "225 Jon Michaels similarly
warns that democratic accountability can be bypassed with private
contractors doing military work. 226
The lack of clear lines of authority and sanctioning power over
civilian contractors also potentially impairs the nation's reputation
internationally. The Iraqis do not distinguish between the civilian
contractors and the U.S. military in judging the conduct of the U.S.
occupation.227
Foreign policy can be shaped even more insidiously by reliance
on private contractors. As Jim Krane put it for the Associated Press,
"the use of contractors also hides the true costs of war. Their dead
221 See generally Thomas R. Cusack, On the Domestic Political-Economic Sources of American
Military Spending, in THE PoirricAL ECONOMY OF MILITARY SPENDING IN 'nu: UNITED
STATES (Alex Mintz ed., 1992); Karl Deronen, Jr. & Uk Heo, Defense Contracting and Domestic
Politics, 53 Pm.. REs. Q. 753 (2000).
222 Avant, supra note 42; see Michaels, supra note 163, at 1040-41.
2" See Avant, supra note 42.	 .
224 Id.
225 ld. At least one reporter saw a connection between the private military company aid
and later U.S. support. See Richard Whittle, U.S. Loan to Fund Bell Aircraft Deal, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 31, 1996, at 12D.
226 Michaels, supra note 163, at 1011, 1050-52.
227 Sec Michaels, supra note 163, at 1040-41; Barry Yeoman, Need an Army? Just Pick Up
the Phone, N.Y. Thus, Apr. 2, 2004, at A19; see alsoJon Michaels, Deforming Welfare: How the
Dominant Narratives of Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 Scum
HAL'. L. Rix. 573, 636-39 (2004) (considering civic harms of privatization in the context
of welfare reform).
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aren't added to official body counts."228 With an estimated thirty to
forty private contractor employees killed due to fighting in Iraq in
2004, and many more killed in accidents, including these private em-
ployees would notably increase the total casualties and injuries from
the war. 229
Use of contractors contributes to a lack of transparency in the
conduct of military activities regarding not only casualties and inju-
ries, but also total numbers of people deployed, and, indeed, the total
size of the government-sponsored effort. 23° This puts the scale of the
initiative outside of public awareness and full political discussion, ob-
scuring choices about military needs and human implications."'
Congressional interest in private contracting may emerge, but full
oversight will be hampered by the insulation of the private companies
from public review. 232
 Even information about procurement decisions
and practices has been privatized, placing them further out of public
reach. 233
 Previously, the Federal Procurement Data Center made
available through the Internet information about the allocation of
defense contracts to private firms, which could be searched by the
name of the firm. 234
 In the past year, however, the government has
outsourced this service and now charges for access to the data. 235 The
ability of the government to bypass public debate may also make it
easier, on occasion, for the government to plan and launch either an
aggressive war or a humanitarian intervention. Even if I agree with
the ends, should I not worry if the means require bypassing demo-
cratic review?
I began with a caveat about the limitations of my entire discus-
sion given the curbs on information available about outsourcing by
228 Kane, supra note 219, at A8.
229
 Sonic estimates indicate that more than 200 private contract employees have been
killed in Iraq. Risk and Reward in Iraq, N. TERRITORY NEWS (Attstl.), May 7, 2005, at 15.
290 Light, supra note 73; see Schooner, supra note 18, at 549-50, 553; PM. Singer, The
Contract the Military Needs to Break, WAsii. Pos-r, Sept. 12, 2004, at B3; Singer, supra note 15.
291 Sec Singer, supra note 15. The 15,000-20,000 private contractor employees in Iraq
point to the Bush Administration's inadequate planning and preparation, lack of trans-
parency about the war's financial and human cost, and Its sense of denial about whether it
put enough American troops on the ground to accomplish the task handed to them....
The hiring of such a large private force and the ensuing casualties that it has taken outside
of public awareness and discussion have served as a novel means for displacing some of the
political costs of the war." Id.
232 See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 35, at 143.
233 See Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1, at 31-33 (testimony of Steve Schooner).
234 Id.
221 Id.
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the military.236 Even if it had the political will to try to exercise over-
sight, Congress would be largely constrained in reviewing the actions
and practices of private military contractors.237 Media and ordinary
citizens—even competitors—also face constraints, including curbs on
otherwise available tools of disclosure. 238 In the past, courts have con-
strued exemptions from the FOIA to protect private contractor rec-
ords compiled for law enforcement purposes. 239 Reading together the
Trade Secrets Act and the FOIA exemption for trade secrets and
confidential or privileged commercial or financial information, courts
have rejected release of prices paid by the government for servicing
planes to be flown by military personnel on dangerous missions.240 At
stake in these rather technical cases is nothing less than the ability of
citizens to know what the government is doing, and yet outsourcing
veils its conduct. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit asserted that the prices at issue concern the internal workings
of a contractor, not the Government.241 As Judge Garland wrote in
partial dissent, this nondisclosure interferes with the public's ability to
evaluate "whether the government is receiving value for taxpayer
funds, or whether the contract is instead an instance of waste, fraud,
or abuse of the public trust." 242 Yet the public interest is even more
extensive when the military outsources logistics, services, and security
to a contractor.243 It remains to be seen how transparent any of those
actions will become.
236 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
237 See SnNElisTim , supra note 35, at 143.
2" See id.
239 See John Doe Agency v, John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152-53, 157-58 (1989). Fo-
cusing on the format in which data can be disclosed, a court did reject a summary judg-
ment ruling denying a request for procurement data in an electronic format. TPS, Inc, v.
U.S. Dep't of Def., 330 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003).
24°
 E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 375 F.3d 1182, 1193 (D.C.
Cir. 2004); see id. at 1194 (Garland, J., dissenting in part) (characterizing the contract at
issue); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 180 F.3d
303, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (rejecting disclosure of line item prices in contract awarded to
private company by NASA); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Widnall, 57 F.3d 1162, 1164 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (noting that items falling within trade secret exemption from FOIA may not be
d isclosed )
2" McDonnell Douglas Carp., 375 F.3d at 1193.
242 Id.
245 See Dorgan Hearing, supra note 1, at 12-13; Guttman, supra note 21.
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CONCLUSION
Besides jeopardizing internal democratic monitoring and besides
failing to control costs or even the performance of private employees,
the expanded governmental use of private military companies erodes
the control of force represented by the ascendancy of the nation-
state. 244 The nation-state itself had an interest in demonstrating its
neutrality vis-à-vis other states as part of the Westphalian Pact: the
leaders of each nation would respect the borders and sovereignty of
another state while expecting other states to respect their own bor-
ders and sovereignty. In turn, the leaders would regulate the conduct
of their own citizens to make sure they would not join foreign armies
or otherwise jeopardize this system. And deployment of a non-
national by a foreign sovereign would itself be viewed as infringement
of the home nation's sovereignty.
Thomas Jefferson argued that "the granting of military commis-
sions, within the United States, by any other authority than their own,
is an infringement on their sovereignty, and particularly so when
granted to their own citizens, to lead them to commit acts contrary to
the duties they owe their own country." 245 As the system developed, it
supported national self-interest by ensuring that "no one can raise an
army within the jurisdiction of the United States with the intention to
commit hostile acts against a state friendly to the U.S. state."246 By
controlling private desires for money or adventure, the nation-state
would build a more secure world.
Signs of the decline of the nation-state come in many contexts
besides the rising use of private military companies. 247 Nonetheless,
the growing role of private military companies is a symptom of a
larger, dangerous challenge to the aspirations of order in the world
represented by the system of nation-states and the rule of law. 248
244 See Thomson, supra note 42, at 36-39.
245 Id. at 37 (citing CHARLES G. FENWICK, THE NEUTRALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES 19 (1913)).
246 Id, at 38.
247 Sec John 0. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation States and the Rise of the Regime
of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903, 905 (1996); Robert D. Kaplan, The Com-
ing Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease Are Rapidly Destroying
the Social Fabric of Ou r Planet, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1994, at 46, 73-74. See generally KEN-
ICHI OIIMAE, TIIE END OF 'ME NATION STATE: THE RISE or REGIONAL EC.ONOM1ES (1995);
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
246 See McGinnis, supra note 247, at 905; Kaplan, supra note 247, at 46, 73-74. See gener-
ally OHMAE, MOM note 247; SLAUGHTER, supra note 247.
